Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
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Publication:1651221
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.007zbMath1400.91366OpenAlexW2596019922MaRDI QIDQ1651221
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/74649
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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Cites Work
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