When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.02.008zbMath1117.91396OpenAlexW2039626832MaRDI QIDQ1774815

Cheng Wang, Stephan E. Spear

Publication date: 4 May 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.008

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (15)

Optimal CEO turnover ⋮ Termination as an incentive device ⋮ FINANCING VENTURES ⋮ A theory of political and economic cycles ⋮ Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans's dilemma ⋮ Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model ⋮ Optimal self-enforcement and termination ⋮ Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs ⋮ Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover ⋮ Wealth effects and agency costs ⋮ Dynamic contracts with random monitoring ⋮ A theory of political cycles ⋮ Ambiguity in dynamic contracts ⋮ Attorney fees in repeated relationships ⋮ Outside opportunities and termination

Cites Work

• Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting

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