When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
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Publication:1774815
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.008zbMath1117.91396MaRDI QIDQ1774815
Publication date: 4 May 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.008
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