Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00501-8zbMath1037.91009OpenAlexW3123793364MaRDI QIDQ1864827

Maria Montero

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00501-8

zbMATH Keywords

KernelApex gamesNon-cooperative bargainingRandom proposers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (11)

A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability ⋮ The effects of excluding coalitions ⋮ An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification ⋮ Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices ⋮ Multilateral negotiations and formation of coalitions ⋮ A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel ⋮ Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games ⋮ Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence ⋮ Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application

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