Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00251-5zbMath1073.91022MaRDI QIDQ1876656

Arieh Gavious, Aner Sela, Gadi Fibich

Publication date: 20 August 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Perturbation analysisRevenue equivalenceAsymmetric auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (16)

Deals or No Deals: Contract Design for Online Advertising ⋮ Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences ⋮ Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts ⋮ All-pay auctions with risk-averse players ⋮ First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge ⋮ A NOTE ON THE EFFECT OF ASYMMETRY ON REVENUE IN SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS ⋮ Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions ⋮ The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Large auctions with risk-averse bidders ⋮ Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction ⋮ Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders ⋮ Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations

Cites Work

• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach

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