A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80018-1zbMath0833.90135MaRDI QIDQ1890912

John C. Harsanyi

Publication date: 28 May 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionnoncooperative gamesone-point solution concept

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items

Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study ⋮ On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten ⋮ Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games ⋮ Games with imperfectly observable commitment ⋮ Effective choice in all the symmetric \(2\times 2\) games ⋮ Inverse optimization of integer programming games for parameter estimation arising from competitive retail location selection ⋮ Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental stag-hunt games ⋮ Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information ⋮ The noncooperative transportation problem and linear generalized Nash games ⋮ An experimental study of costly coordination ⋮ Prisoners' other dilemma ⋮ Coordination after gains and losses: is prospect theory's value function predictive for games? ⋮ From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence ⋮ List of Publications: John C. Harsanyi, December 1997 ⋮ Equilibrium Selection via Optimal Transport ⋮ Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result ⋮ Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture ⋮ Team reasoning and the rational choice of payoff-dominant outcomes in games

Cites Work

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• Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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