The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies

DOI10.1007/BF01258206zbMath0835.90144MaRDI QIDQ1893197

Olivier Gossner

Publication date: 15 April 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

finitely repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (19)

Bounded memory folk theorem ⋮ How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? ⋮ Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games ⋮ The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting ⋮ Finitely repeated games with monitoring options ⋮ On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality ⋮ Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals ⋮ Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter? ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring ⋮ A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games ⋮ Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions ⋮ Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem ⋮ Myopic perception in repeated games ⋮ Perturbed finitely repeated games ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon ⋮ Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated \(N\)-person games.

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Overlapping Generation Games with Mixed Strategies

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