On countervailing incentives
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Publication:1897321
DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1040zbMath0830.90024OpenAlexW1998428832MaRDI QIDQ1897321
Giovanni Maggi, Andrés Rodríguez-Clare
Publication date: 27 August 1995
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1040
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