An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5zbMath1260.91114OpenAlexW1965583710MaRDI QIDQ1944867

Toyotaka Sakai

Publication date: 28 March 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessfair allocationequal treatment of equalssecond price auctionnon-quasilinear preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains, Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects, Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money, Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions, Non-bossiness, Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money, Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule, Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity, Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money, Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry, Competitive Equilibria in Two-Sided Matching Markets with General Utility Functions, Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

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