Majority rule in the absence of a majority

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.006zbMath1422.91226OpenAlexW2159316326WikidataQ127756835 ScholiaQ127756835MaRDI QIDQ2324800

Klaus Nehring, Marcus Pivato

Publication date: 12 September 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

votingjudgment aggregationdisagreementmedian rulesupermajority efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

The median rule in judgement aggregation ⋮ Local supermajorities ⋮ A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties ⋮ Weighted representative democracy ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ The Complexity Landscape of Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation

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