A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2014.12.019zbMath1311.91013OpenAlexW2077191042MaRDI QIDQ2341746

Eric Rémila, Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal

Publication date: 28 April 2015

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2014.12.019

zbMATH Keywords

direct-sum decompositionallocation rulesaddition invariancetransfer invariance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Spaces of games (91A70)

Related Items (5)

Characterizations of weighted and equal division values ⋮ Axioms of invariance for TU-games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On the inverse problem for a subclass of linear, symmetric and efficient values of cooperative TU games ⋮ Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel

Cites Work

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