Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0253-0zbMath1137.91371OpenAlexW2035733126MaRDI QIDQ2426966

M. Remzi Sanver, Emre Doğan

Publication date: 14 May 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0253-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (1)

Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets

Cites Work

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