Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001zbMath1283.91141OpenAlexW1604893595MaRDI QIDQ2437848

Paula Jaramillo, Flip Klijn, Çağatay Kayı

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/125692

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumwelfaredeferred acceptancemany-to-one matchingdropping strategiesfilled positions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (4)

The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically ⋮ Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists ⋮ On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets ⋮ Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies

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