Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0674-2zbMath1288.91126OpenAlexW2088605609MaRDI QIDQ2453443

Yoichi Kasajima

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0674-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (17)

A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem ⋮ Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach ⋮ Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains ⋮ Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object ⋮ Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line ⋮ Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment ⋮ The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain ⋮ Assigning agents to a line ⋮ When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? ⋮ Random assignments of bundles ⋮ Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem ⋮ Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited ⋮ The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching ⋮ Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure

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