Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005zbMath1318.91029OpenAlexW394103507WikidataQ42180484 ScholiaQ42180484MaRDI QIDQ2516229

Karl Sigmund, Arne Traulsen, Christian Hilbe

Publication date: 12 August 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescooperationreciprocityzero-determinant strategiesextortion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (20)

Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games ⋮ Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games ⋮ Evolution of cooperation through adaptive interaction in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with three strategies ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in infinitely repeated three-player prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of zero-determinant strategies in repeated multiplayer games ⋮ Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ Heterogeneous cooperative belief for social dilemma in multi-agent system ⋮ Generalizing Pure and Impure Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas to the Case of Infinite and Infinitesimal Quantities ⋮ Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ Non-Archimedean game theory: a numerical approach ⋮ Zero-determinant strategies in finitely repeated games ⋮ Autocratic strategies for alternating games ⋮ A Robust Saturated Strategy for $n$-Player Prisoner's Dilemma ⋮ Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games ⋮ Reactive strategies: an inch of memory, a mile of equilibria ⋮ Reactive learning strategies for iterated games ⋮ Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies ⋮ A survey of critical structures in competitive games ⋮ How information prospection facilitates spatial coverage of self-avoiding walks

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