Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
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Publication:3471801
DOI10.2307/2937792zbMath0695.90018MaRDI QIDQ3471801
Publication date: 1990
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2937792
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