Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence

DOI10.2307/2171941zbMath0891.90039OpenAlexW2151678399MaRDI QIDQ4368515

Georg Kirchsteiger, Simon Gächter, Ernst Fehr

Publication date: 4 December 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171941

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardprincipal agentenforcement of contractsreciprocal responses

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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