On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗

DOI10.1080/02331930108844574zbMath0996.91084OpenAlexW2089514831MaRDI QIDQ4531544

Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Ruth Martínez, Jorge A. Oviedo

Publication date: 22 May 2002

Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143744

zbMATH Keywords

latticestabilitymany-to-one matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (20)

The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts ⋮ A generalized assignment game ⋮ The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings ⋮ The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model ⋮ A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts ⋮ On Lattice and DA ⋮ The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences ⋮ Equivalences between two matching models: stability ⋮ A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' ⋮ An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings. ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ Median stable matching for college admissions ⋮ Binary operations for the lattice structure in a many-to-many matching model ⋮ A binary operation-based representation of a lattice ⋮ Agreement toward stability in matching markets ⋮ Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations ⋮ Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts

Cites Work

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• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
• Voting by Committees
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes

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