A decomposition of strategy-proofness

DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0959-YMaRDI QIDQ331707zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nozomu Muto, Shin Sato

Publication date 27 October 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0959-y

zbMATH Keywords

individual bounded responsestrategy-proofness decompositiontop-restricted AM-proofnessweak monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
• Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
• Bounded response of aggregated preferences
• Circular domains
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?

Cited in

(8)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1897421 (Why is no real title available?)
• Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps
• On completeness of narrowing strategies
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
• An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• Decomposing random mechanisms

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