Combining the Shapley value and the equal division solution: an overview
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Cites work
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- The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value
- Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
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