Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice
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Cites work
- A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
- Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice
- Escaping Nash Inflation
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- How noise matters.
- Large deviations and multinomial probit choice
- Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability
- Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
- Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
- Regular Synthesis and Sufficiency Conditions for Optimality
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
- Sufficient Conditions for Optimality and the Justification of the Dynamic Programming Method
- The Evolution of Conventions
- The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes
- The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice
Cited in
(9)- Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games
- Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
- Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
- Hamilton-Jacobi equations with semilinear costs and state constraints, with applications to large deviations in games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7689526 (Why is no real title available?)
- Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit
- Tributes to Bill Sandholm
- Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice
- Tacit coordination in Choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries
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