Optimal policy with credibility concerns

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.04.015MaRDI QIDQ405540zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yang K. Lu

Publication date 5 September 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.015

zbMATH Keywords

time inconsistencyoptimal taxationimperfect credibilityreputation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world
• Rules without commitment: reputation and incentives
• Optimal taxes without commitment
• Optimal Taxation with Private Government Information
• Taxation without commitment

Cites work

• A Theory of Credibility
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Public trust and government betrayal
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
• Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge of rationality
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality
• Who wants a good reputation?

Cited in

(6)

• Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns *
• Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world
• Public trust and government betrayal
• Cheap talk, gullibility, and welfare in an environmental taxation game
• Doubts about the model and optimal policy
• Rules without commitment: reputation and incentives

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