Publication:2935186

DOI10.1111/IERE.12083zbMATH Open1404.91084OpenAlexW1488238968WikidataQ56387585 ScholiaQ56387585MaRDI QIDQ2935186FDOQ2935186

Yaron Azrieli, Semin Kim

Publication date: 22 December 2014

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12083

zbMATH Keywords

decision rulesPareto efficiencyweighted majority ruleutilitarian rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• On the Number of Successes in Independent Trials
• Sequential Equilibria
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
• Efficient compromising
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives
• On the Justice of Decision Rules
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Bayesian Implementation
• The veil of public ignorance
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• Non-Bayesian optimal search and dynamic implementation
• Measurement theory and the foundations of utilitarianism

Cited In (18)

• The winner‐take‐all dilemma
• Symmetric reduced-form voting
• Stable constitutions
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
• The price of `one person, one vote'
• All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision
• The optimal majority threshold as a function of the variation coefficient of the environment
• Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
• An experimental study of voting with costly delay
• Condorcet meets Bentham
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
• Ordering Pareto-optima through majority voting
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Efficient voting with penalties
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Information aggregation with a continuum of types

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