Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2012.01.005zbMath1246.91042OpenAlexW2091246836MaRDI QIDQ449053

Josep Freixas

Publication date: 11 September 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/16144

zbMATH Keywords

voting rulespower indices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (12)

Three-valued simple games ⋮ Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention ⋮ Reformulation of some indices using null player free winning coalitions ⋮ Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index for simple multichoice voting games ⋮ A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention ⋮ Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index ⋮ On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention ⋮ Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention ⋮ Power indices in the context of social learning behaviour in social networks ⋮ SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES ⋮ The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory? ⋮ A critical analysis on the notion of power

Cites Work

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• Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
• Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Ternary voting games
• On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval
• On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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