Decentralized job matching

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0218-xzbMath1216.91017OpenAlexW2108738437MaRDI QIDQ532508

Guillaume Haeringer, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269572/files/twerp688.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumcommitmenttwo-sided matchingjob market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (13)

Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching ⋮ Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market ⋮ Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives ⋮ A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network Routing ⋮ Multi-agent reinforcement learning for decentralized stable matching ⋮ Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium ⋮ Decentralized matching: the role of commitment ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm

Cites Work

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• Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
• Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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