The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.010zbMath1232.91533OpenAlexW2101083265WikidataQ124815375 ScholiaQ124815375MaRDI QIDQ617603

Ruth Martínez, Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Jorge A. Oviedo

Publication date: 21 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/15396

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingblocking lemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts ⋮ On the number of employed in the matching model ⋮ Fair student placement ⋮ Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach ⋮ The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings ⋮ Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

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• On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model^∗
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

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