Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2008.11.005zbMath1187.91062OpenAlexW2060522636MaRDI QIDQ835815

Michael Zuckerman, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Ariel D. Procaccia

Publication date: 31 August 2009

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2008.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexityvotingcomputational social choicemanipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (22)

Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting ⋮ Manipulation complexity of same-system runoff elections ⋮ Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules ⋮ The complexity of probabilistic lobbying ⋮ Normalized range voting broadly resists control ⋮ Gerrymandering on graphs: computational complexity and parameterized algorithms ⋮ Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting ⋮ Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams ⋮ Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules ⋮ Obvious manipulability of voting rules ⋮ Strategic voting in negotiating teams ⋮ Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules ⋮ Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules ⋮ Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions ⋮ Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control ⋮ Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis ⋮ Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections ⋮ A new perspective on implementation by voting trees ⋮ Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems ⋮ Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems

Cites Work

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• The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On Approximating Optimal Weighted Lobbying, and Frequency of Correctness Versus Average-Case Polynomial Time
• Financial Cryptography and Data Security
• Algorithms and Computation

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