Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.08.003zbMath1142.91600OpenAlexW2077681802MaRDI QIDQ869847

Eiichi Miyagawa, Toyotaka Sakai, Biung-Ghi Ju

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

flat taxproportional ruleBayes rulelinear opinion poolBankruptcy problemmanipulation via merging or splittingno advantageous reallocationreallocation-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (53)

Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for adjudicating conflicting claims ⋮ Taxation and poverty ⋮ Sharing sequential values in a network ⋮ Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks ⋮ The measurement of the value of a language ⋮ Mixed rules in multi‐issue allocation situations ⋮ Extended proportionality in division problems with multiple references ⋮ Monotonic redistribution of non-negative allocations: a case for proportional taxation revisited ⋮ Differentially monotonic redistribution of income ⋮ A random arrival rule for division problems with multiple references ⋮ Liberal political equality does \textit{not} imply proportional representation ⋮ Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems ⋮ Non-proportional inequality preservation in gains and losses ⋮ ERRATUM: "BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION" ⋮ New characterizations of the constrained equal awards rule in multi-issue allocation situations ⋮ Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split ⋮ Axiomatizations of convex compromise rules for redistribution of non-negative income ⋮ Random conjugates of bankruptcy rules ⋮ Design of water quality policies based on proportionality in multi-issue problems with crossed claims ⋮ Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems ⋮ Reflecting inequality of claims in gains and losses ⋮ Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results ⋮ A consistent talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references ⋮ Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: an axiomatic approach ⋮ A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims ⋮ New results for multi-issue allocation problems and their solutions ⋮ The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ Broadcasting revenue sharing after cancelling sports competitions ⋮ A coalitional procedure leading to a family of bankruptcy rules ⋮ Sharing cost of network among users with differentiated willingness to pay ⋮ Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem ⋮ Loss sharing: characterizing a new class of rules ⋮ For claims problems, another compromise between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules ⋮ On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws ⋮ Asymmetric parametric division rules ⋮ Rationing with baselines: the composition extension operator ⋮ Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness ⋮ A noncooperative approach to bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate ⋮ Bilateral redistribution ⋮ Proportional rules for state contingent claims ⋮ Priority and proportionality in bankruptcy ⋮ A NOTE ON PASSEPARTOUT PROBLEMS ⋮ New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation ⋮ Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims ⋮ Knapsack cost sharing ⋮ Progressive and merging-proof taxation ⋮ On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study ⋮ A characterization of the proportional rule in multi-issue allocation situations ⋮ An axiomatic theory of political representation ⋮ Laissez-faire or full redistribution? ⋮ Some game theoretic marketing attribution models ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

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