Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.001zbMath1369.91051OpenAlexW1651216127MaRDI QIDQ893399

Rudolf Müller, Juan Carlos Carbajal

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

2-cycle monotonicityrevenue equivalencecyclic monotonicitymonotonic transformations in differencestruthful implementability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences ⋮ Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments ⋮ The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions ⋮ Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer ⋮ Local incentive compatibility with transfers ⋮ On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms ⋮ Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles

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