Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.003zbMath1141.91337OpenAlexW2072316084MaRDI QIDQ931782

Andrés Perea

Publication date: 26 June 2008

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesbelief revisionbackward inductionminimal belief change

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items

AGENT CONNECTEDNESS AND BACKWARD INDUCTION ⋮ The logic of backward induction ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox

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