Sharing a river among satiable agents

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.005zbMath1152.91613WikidataQ59663893 ScholiaQ59663893MaRDI QIDQ952762

Stefan Ambec, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 14 November 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

fairness; water allocation; externalities; core solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

91B18: Public goods

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

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