Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
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Publication:1097824
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90114-1zbMath0635.90015OpenAlexW2136431647WikidataQ56852504 ScholiaQ56852504MaRDI QIDQ1097824
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90114-1
tradebargainingbargaincompetitive (flow) equilibriuminfinite sequence of datesnon-cooperative, strategic game
Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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