Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2439zbMath0914.90077OpenAlexW3082990237MaRDI QIDQ1276114

Susheng Wang, Son Ku Kim

Publication date: 11 April 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/864dc6def7c7579a1f08aa23069b6a25eaa20656

zbMATH Keywords

optimal contractsdouble moral-hazard situation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Related Items (10)

An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard ⋮ Robust contracting under double moral hazard ⋮ Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard ⋮ Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions ⋮ Quality collaboration contracts under product pricing strategies ⋮ Percentage rent contracts between co-stores ⋮ Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard ⋮ Serving many masters: an agent and his principals ⋮ Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability ⋮ On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems

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• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model

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