Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games

DOI10.1007/BF01213814zbMath0811.90135MaRDI QIDQ1339020

Yaw Nyarko

Publication date: 1 May 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriainfinitely repeated normal form game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (17)

Bounded rationality and learning. Introduction ⋮ Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems ⋮ On the structure and diversity of rational beliefs ⋮ Belief-based equilibrium ⋮ Repeated large games with incomplete information ⋮ Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs ⋮ Reputation versus social learning ⋮ Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games? ⋮ Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Epistemic conditions for rationalizability ⋮ Learning in Games ⋮ Learning a population distribution ⋮ Calibrated forecasting and merging ⋮ Mutual observability and the convergence of actions in a multi-person two-armed bandit model ⋮ Relative entropy in sequential decision problems ⋮ Bounded rational learning in differential information economies: Core and value ⋮ Calibration and Bayesian learning.

Cites Work

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