Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2221zbMath0883.90030OpenAlexW2138454030MaRDI QIDQ1363370

Robert P. Gilles, Suzanne Scotchmer

Publication date: 7 August 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/22k559dk

zbMATH Keywords

Lindahl equilibriumexhaustion of blocking opportunitiesreplicated club economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (15)

Club theory and household formation ⋮ Two characterizations of cost share equilibria ⋮ Bargaining cum voice ⋮ Groups, collective decisions and markets ⋮ Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition ⋮ Power at general equilibrium ⋮ On efficient firm formation ⋮ Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes ⋮ Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods ⋮ Clubs and the market: Large finite economies ⋮ OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS ⋮ Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy ⋮ Stable Matching in Large Economies ⋮ Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs ⋮ Household formation and markets

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
• A Tiebout theorem
• Public goods, growth, and welfare
• Equilibria, the core and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good: A correction
• Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
• Valuation equilibrium with clubs
• The core and the hedonic core: Equivalence and comparative statics
• Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
• Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types
• The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
• Externality pricing in club economies
• Tastes, Skills, and Local Public Goods
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy

This page was built for publication: Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods