Bargaining and bargaining sets.

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0895zbMath1033.91010OpenAlexW2031620977MaRDI QIDQ1864805

Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0e9cc242be458f4b9527b2b59e4adc4a92abea8a

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumimplementationsubgame perfect equilibriumbargaining setapproximate implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core ⋮ A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set ⋮ Strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems ⋮ Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities ⋮ Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem ⋮ Losing money to make money: the benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports ⋮ Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem ⋮ Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective ⋮ A noncooperative interpretation of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set ⋮ A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel ⋮ A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds ⋮ Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: a convergence result

Cites Work

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• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
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