Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
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Publication:1877156
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.005zbMath1105.91013OpenAlexW1972648113MaRDI QIDQ1877156
Andrew McLennan, Hülya Eraslan
Publication date: 16 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.005
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremArrow's theoremPolitical economyVotingCandidate stabilityCandidate withdrawal
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Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship ⋮ An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit ⋮ Candidate stability and voting correspondences ⋮ A unifying impossibility theorem
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