Cycles of learning in the centipede game

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0707zbMath0938.91012OpenAlexW2077334350MaRDI QIDQ1972850

Giovanni Ponti

Publication date: 26 April 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0307099307cc892404b58db2e99d9d9844776d14

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityevolutionary game theorybackward-inductionreplicator dynamics with drift

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (8)

Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game. ⋮ Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game ⋮ Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning ⋮ The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction ⋮ Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games ⋮ ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game ⋮ Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play

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