Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.10.009zbMath1505.91064OpenAlexW4307295765MaRDI QIDQ2100656

Yi-Chun Chen, Satoru Takahashi, Siyang Xiong

Publication date: 24 November 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.009

zbMATH Keywords

refinementrationalizabilityuniversal type spacestructure theoremgeneric uniquenessupper hemicontinuity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge

Cites Work

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