On stable rules for selecting committees
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Publication:2358564
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.008zbMath1395.91169OpenAlexW2590649620MaRDI QIDQ2358564
Publication date: 15 June 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631177/file/Stable%20JME_revised2.pdf
Related Items (6)
Gehrlein stable committee with multi-modal preferences ⋮ Coincidence of Condorcet committees ⋮ Robustness among multiwinner voting rules ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees ⋮ When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? ⋮ Electing a committee with dominance constraints
Cites Work
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