Sharing a polluted river

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.10.001zbMath1155.91449DBLPjournals/geb/NiW07OpenAlexW3121242077WikidataQ59663901 ScholiaQ59663901MaRDI QIDQ2384436

Debing Ni, Yuntong Wang

Publication date: 21 September 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.001

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueExternalityfair allocation of pollution costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• Sharing a river.
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus

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