How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0052-4zbMath1132.91406DBLPjournals/scw/Slinko06OpenAlexW2066702336WikidataQ61586346 ScholiaQ61586346MaRDI QIDQ2500745

Arkadii M. Slinko

Publication date: 18 August 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0052-4

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionmanipulabilityimpartial anonymous culturesocial choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (5)

The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models ⋮ Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules ⋮ Is it ever safe to vote strategically? ⋮ On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations

Cites Work

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• How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
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• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
• A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
• Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
• On probability models in voting theory

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