Combinatorial auctions for electronic business

DOI10.1007/BF02706244zbMath1137.91415MaRDI QIDQ2571439

Pankaj Dayama, Yadati Narahari

Publication date: 8 November 2005

Published in: Sādhanā (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

winner determination problem; combinatorial auctions; bidding languages; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms; multi-unit combinatorial auctions; e-Business

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A46: Combinatorial games

Related Items

Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions, Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results, Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results, Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions, Allocation of advertising space by a web service provider using combinatorial auctions, Dynamic pricing models for electronic business

Uses Software

• CABOB

Cites Work

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