Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.001zbMath1281.91040OpenAlexW2109420584MaRDI QIDQ2636779

Huanxing Yang, Andrew McGee

Publication date: 18 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.001

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkmultiple senders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (12)

A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies ⋮ Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information ⋮ Two-sided strategic information transmission ⋮ Strategic information transmission networks ⋮ Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Independent versus collective expertise ⋮ Expert panels with selective investigation ⋮ The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games ⋮ Receiver's sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk ⋮ Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders ⋮ Competitive cheap talk

Cites Work

• Strategic information transmission networks
• How to talk to multiple audiences
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• A Model of Expertise
• Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
• Allocation of Decision-making Authority
• Strategic Communication Networks
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Optimal Delegation
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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