Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information

DOI10.2307/2951751zbMath0816.90024OpenAlexW2006075621MaRDI QIDQ4319564

No author found.

Publication date: 11 January 1995

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b8054297ed2fd0e7c4837160c7c1528b95a6c62c

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyasymmetric informationheterogeneous prior beliefsno trade theorems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (49)

Informed speculation with k-level reasoning ⋮ Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms ⋮ Almost common priors ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors ⋮ Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty ⋮ Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models ⋮ No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors ⋮ Monologues, dialogues, and common priors ⋮ Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information ⋮ The value of information under unawareness ⋮ No trade ⋮ ``Agreeing to disagree type results under ambiguity ⋮ Belief consistency and trade consistency ⋮ ``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach. ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ The cycles approach ⋮ Information-based trade ⋮ Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences ⋮ Heterogeneous beliefs and optimal ownership in entrepreneurial financing decisions ⋮ Monotonic models and cycles ⋮ Similarity of differential information with subjective prior beliefs ⋮ Agreeing to agree and Dutch books ⋮ The positive foundation of the common prior assumption ⋮ Countable spaces and common priors ⋮ Speculation under unawareness ⋮ Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors ⋮ The veil of public ignorance ⋮ Common priors under endogenous uncertainty ⋮ Information, trade and incomplete markets ⋮ Talking with an extremist ⋮ Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty ⋮ On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets ⋮ From posteriors to priors via cycles ⋮ On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands ⋮ Iterated expectations and common priors ⋮ Common priors and separation of convex sets ⋮ Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds ⋮ Rational expectations can preclude trades ⋮ (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) ⋮ Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria ⋮ On attitude polarization under Bayesian learning with non-additive beliefs ⋮ Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors ⋮ Rationalizable trade ⋮ Rational beliefs and endogenous uncertainty ⋮ Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information ⋮ On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief ⋮ Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors ⋮ Characterizing the common prior assumption.

This page was built for publication: Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information