Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices

DOI10.3982/ECTA10285zbMath1419.91269OpenAlexW3123954384MaRDI QIDQ4615891

Subir Bose, Ludovic Renou

Publication date: 29 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10285

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguitymechanism designmultiple priorscommunication device

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

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