Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00496.xzbMath1130.91313OpenAlexW3123307456MaRDI QIDQ5473017

George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Martin W. Cripps

Publication date: 19 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/03-016.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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