Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement

DOI10.2307/2298088zbMath0719.90016OpenAlexW2105048790MaRDI QIDQ5752266

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole

Publication date: 1990

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/81244/

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcommitmentrenegotiationtwo-period procurement modeloptimal long-term contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (33)

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