Optimality and robustness of the English auction
In \textit{P. R. Milgrom} and \textit{R. J. Weber}'s [``A theory of auctions and competitive bidding Econometrica 50, 1089-1122 (1982; Zbl 0487.90017)] ``general symmetric model, under a few additional regularity conditions, the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within the class of all posterior-implementable trading procedures and fails to do so among all interim incentive-compatible procedure in which ``losers do not pay. The author ascertains that these results suggest that appropriate notions of robustness and simplicity which imply the optimality of the English auction for a risk-neutral seller must impose ``bargaining-like features on the set of feasible trading mechanisms.
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- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Ex Post Information in Auctions
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19089 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3337815 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
- The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
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- The English auction with differentiated commodities
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- Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
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- (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)
- Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
- Auctions in which losers set the price
- A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result
- Note on ``Guarantees in auctions: the auction house as negotiator and managerial decision maker
- An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions
- Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
- An Extension to the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
- Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
- Credible auctions: a trilemma
- Mechanism design for correlated valuations: efficient methods for revenue maximization
- Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem
- Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions
- On efficiency of the English auction
- Second best efficiency and the English auction
- Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately
- Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
- Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
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