Participation costs and efficient auctions
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Recommendations
Cited in
(46)- Auctions with costly information acquisition
- Auction design with opportunity cost
- Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry
- Investment decisions under first and second price auctions
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- Auctions of heterogeneous objects
- Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs
- No-trade in second-price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices
- Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
- First-price auction implements efficient investments
- Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
- Mechanism design with information acquisition
- Optimal search auctions
- Participation in auctions
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs
- Auctions with entry and resale
- Auctions with flexible information acquisition
- Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Optimal auctions with simultaneous and costly participation
- Participation constraints in the Vickrey auction
- Participation and exclusion in auctions
- Participation Costs and Inefficiency in Takeover Contests
- On favoritism in auctions with entry
- Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
- Second-price auctions with private entry costs
- Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
- Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
- Participation constraints in first-price auctions
- Information acquisition in all-pay contests
- Affiliated common value auctions with costly entry
- Second-price auctions with information acquisition costs
- Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs
- Auction design with costly preference elicitation
- Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
- Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
- On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
- An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
- Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
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