Reciprocal contracting

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.04.003MaRDI QIDQ896940zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael Peters

Publication date 15 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyrevelation principledigital markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Recommendations

• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Contractible contracts in common agency problems

Cites work

• A commitment folk theorem
• A course in game theory.
• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Common Agency
• Contractible contracts in common agency problems
• Definable and contractible contracts
• Equilibrium mechanisms in a decentralized market
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
• On the use of menus in sequential common agency
• Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

Cited in

(5)

• Definable and contractible contracts
• Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
• Private communication in competing mechanism games
• Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games
• Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium

This page was built for publication: Reciprocal contracting

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q896940)